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Abstract
If an organisation wants to secure its IT assets, where should the secu-
rity mechanisms be placed? The traditional view is the hard-shell model,
where an organisation secures all its assets using a fixed security border:
What is inside the security perimeter is more or less trusted, what is out-
side is not. Due to changes in technologies, business processes and their
legal environments this approach is not adequate anymore. This paper ex-
amines this process, which was coined de-perimeterisation by the Jericho
Forum. In this paper we analyse and define the concepts of perimeter and
de-perimeterisation, and show that there is a long term trend in which
de-perimeterisation is iteratively accelerated and decelerated. In times of
accelerated de-perimeterisation, technical and organisational changes take
place by which connectivity between organisations and their environment
scales up significantly. In times of deceleration, technical and organisa-
tional security measures are taken to decrease the security risks that come
with de-perimeterisation, a movement that we call re-perimeterisation.
We identify the technical and organisational mechanisms that facilitate
de-perimeterisation and re-perimeterisation, and discuss the forces that
cause organisations to alternate between these two movements.
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1 Introduction
All need for security starts with the fact that there is an asset that is
potentially threatened by an “outside” influence. It needs to be protected.
Because of this need, we define the policies that should be used to secure
it and implement the necessary technical measures. However, such an
approach is only possible if we can identify the asset, why we want to
protect it and actually have the capabilities to do so. In a networked
world, this is often not the case. We don’t know what or where the asset
is, we are not sure about its value and we have no way of securing it
through our own intervention. For example when we outsource, or when
we rely on services of others, we are faced with the question: how should
we deal with security when assets are so ill-defined and intangible?
This is an important question today, and we can expect that it will
be even more important in the foreseeable future. Already we are see-
ing devices and applications that further blur the IT security landscape.
Mobile devices can access data from anywhere, smart buildings are being
equipped with small microchips that constantly communicate with each
other (and their headquarters). With so-called cloud computing, organisa-
tions can rent virtual PCs by the hour [36, p.23]. This leads to even more
complicated systems, or systems of systems, which span the boundaries of
multiple parties and cross the security perimeters that these parties have
put in place for themselves. Following the Jericho Forum [14], we call this
process de-perimeterisation and it will be the focus of this paper.
Obviously, security can be improved by many types of controls, ranging
from screening new employees to physical access controls in data centers
(Cf. Kartseva [20]). Here, we are mainly concerned with IT and organ-
isational mechanisms. We will investigate two kinds of mechanisms that
foster security in the presence of de-perimeterisation
• technical mechanisms inside of IT; meaning (parts) of applications,
specific IT architectures that can improve security.
• organisational mechanisms; meanings structural changes in the way
organisations cooperate
Our approach is as follows: First we identify and analyse in section
2 the phenomena of de-perimeterisation and the structure of an organi-
sation’s perimeter that makes these phenomena possible. This leads to
definitions of the concepts of perimeter and de-perimeterisation.
Next, we identify in section 3 the technical and organisational mech-
anisms that in the past decades have led to de-perimeterisation on an
unprecedented scale. In section 4 we show that the dynamics of de-
perimeterisation is cyclical. De-perimeterisation is basically an increase
of connectivity. However, the pace of the increase is not fixed. At times
it accelerates, followed by a period of decelerated increase that we call re-
perimeterisation. De-perimeterisation is driven by a desire for increased
speed and flexibility of business and a reduction of the cost of doing busi-
ness; re-perimeterisation is driven by the need for accountability and for a
proper allocation of benefits. In the balance, the trend is towards increased
connectivity but the dynamics of forces towards increase and forces to-
wards decrease leads to an oscillation. We analyse this in section 4.
In section 5 we then review the technical and organisational mecha-
nisms of re-perimeterisation. The contributions of this paper, as discussed
in section 6, are the identification and analysis of a long term oscillation
between de-perimeterisation and re-perimeterisation, and the identifica-
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tion of forces and mechanisms in this long-term trend. We also discuss
possible applications of these findings and we indicate some topics for
further research.
2 The concept of de-perimeterisation
2.1 The Jericho Forum
In order to analyse the problem of de-perimeterisation, we will first at-
tempt to come up with a definition. What exactly is de-perimeterisation?
Since the Jericho Forum coined the term first, we will start by dis-
cussing their views. In their articles and white papers, they give several
definitions of de-perimeterisation.
• The erosion of the network perimeter. [19]
• The Jericho Forum coined the term ”de-perimeterisation” to em-
phasise the trend away from the conventional thinking that focuses
on security at the network boundary - security that is ”hard on the
outside and soft on the inside”. De-perimeterisation is the trend
that is happening, is inevitable, and we need solutions that respond
effectively to it. [9]
• De-perimeterisation is essentially about redesigning the security perime-
ters at the boundaries between an organisation’s own ICT infrastruc-
ture/services and the open networks, individuals and other organi-
sations with which it connects. [14, p.1]
• De-perimeterisation occurs when two common assumptions do not
hold [14, p3]
– an organisation owns, controls and is accountable for the ICT
infrastructure it employs
– all individuals sit within organisations (meaning: are employed
by exactly one organisation).
• de-perimeterisation is not
– Simply removing your border security
– Removing / replacing your firewalls
– Just distributing your security devices inside
– A crusade against deep packet inspection
– Web Services
– Document repositories
– A distributed data model
– The elimination of IDS / IPS
– A sales opportunity
but it may involve all or some of the above. [32, p.9]
We have found no preciser definitions in the published documentation of
the Jericho Forum [9, 19, 15, 17, 16, 14].
Intuitively, the concept of de-perimeterisation is easy to understand; it
is about blurring boundaries between organisations, caused by increased
collaboration between businesses and individuals and the implications for
IT security.
To come up with a definition, we will look at de-perimeterisation (and
security perimeters in general) from two different perspectives, which each
illuminate different aspects.
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• The phenomenon perspective. We examine how entities “outside” a
system can influence entities “inside”.
• The structural perspective: Here, we take a look at the construct
“security perimeter” and its environment.
Finally, we summarise and integrate these definitions.
2.2 De-perimeterisation phenomena
De-perimeterisation is the phenomenon where increasingly, entities can
influence assets of another organisation. For now we will follow the Jericho
Forum by assuming that de-perimeterisation occurs when an organisation
does not own or control its ICT infrastructure or is not accountable for it,
or when individuals are employed by more than one organisation. We will
call these the “de-perimeterisation assumptions”. To analyse what these
mean, we give a number of scenarios in which these assumptions do not
hold.
Some of the following scenarios are well-known, others are specific
examples taken from recent news items. Combined, we have the following
scenarios.
• Microsoft administers a user’s PC with automatic updates.
• Employees use laptop for private and work purposes.
• Laptops with sensitive data move physically between organisations.
• Businesses share the same virtual server.
• An ASP provides another company with an application.
• Employees access company information from outside the building.
• Different organisations hire the same individuals as personnel.
• Organisations rely on other’s IT services.
• An organisation allows remote access from another company for
maintenance.
• An employee connects from home to a server of an organisation he
works for.
• An employee connects from home to a server of an organisation, with
which his employer has a maintenance contract.
• An employee visits the office of a prospect, with data of other or-
ganisations on his laptop.
• A social network site accesses data on another site using AJAX.
• A site uses authentication mechanisms/tokens from another site.
• An employee sends company related data from his home PC to work.
• A user visits a site of another company that has an SSL certificate.
• An organisation allows another organisation to have a look in its
ERP system.
• E-bay blocks insecure browsers, thus influencing what the user can
do with the browser on the laptop.
• A user stores personal information in Google Docs, with a physically
and organisationally unknown location to the user.
When looking at these scenarios several recurring phenomena can be
identified.
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Shift from products to services If we consider relations between
businesses, it is clear that the shift from selling products to selling ser-
vices is related to de-perimeterisation. Intuitively, after an organisation
has bought a product, the producer does not have any influence over it
anymore. This situation changes once the product is evolving (with new
features or patches installed remotely) or when the product is not well-
defined. For example, de-perimeterisation does not occur when a business
acquires a text editor, but it does happen once its starts using the on-line
version of it.
Evolving services In fact, people use systems of which the specifi-
cation is not clear - and which can even change from hour to hour, for
example in the case of an on-line application. This makes it difficult to
investigate how they influence each other.
Complex legal relations As the Jericho Forum pointed out, not all
persons sit within organisations anymore. Actually, the situation is more
complicated - we have persons being employed by multiple businesses or
working independently.
The relationship between companies may not be clear to anyone at
all - sometimes business cooperate according to a contract or service level
agreement, but in other cases there is not necessarily such an agreement
because they are basically free.1
We can also try to define when de-perimeterisation does not occur: In-
tuitively, if a freelancer works for only one company at the same time, that
does by itself not lead to de-perimeterisation. In general, de-perimeterisation
does not occur in a clear hierarchical legal structure. If all influences are
hierarchical, there are no external influences and thus no de-perimeterisation.
Mobility A fourth recurring theme is physical mobility. At work, a
laptop might be subjected to the company’s network policies, but at home,
the employee manages his own. Intuitively the security situation changes,
once someone works from home:
• The laptop is connected to an insecure network.
• The laptop might not be configured according to the organisation’s
policies.
• Family members might have access to the laptop.
• There is no physical oversight of the laptop and the employee.
Thus, mobility contributes to a lack of control or at least increases the
influences that others have on an organisation. However, we do not be-
lieve it is an essential part of de-perimeterisation: Without mobility, de-
perimeterisation still occurs.
The recurring pattern in all these de-perimeterisation phenomena is
this:
A legal entity A is de-perimeterised to the extent that
• the actions of another legal entity B can influence its security during
the working processes of A, where B is not part of A’s hierarchy.
• A has no control over these influences or does not know their extent.
1For example, consider the online application Google Docs
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This is our first approximation of a definition of de-perimeterisation. Note
that a security perimeter is a technical solution that limits these influences.
Now we define de-perimeterisation as a state that is always present to a
smaller or larger extent. If an individual is a member of a committee apart
from being employed at a business, this business will be de-perimeterised.
We do think that this view is correct. Many organisations have proce-
dures in place that require employees to file such relations, in order to
prevent potential conflicts of interests. After all, in such a case we cannot
determine whether a person’s actions are determined by his role inside or
outside of the organisation. This is precisely what de-perimeterisation is
about. Finally, we have to consider the question whether an individual
can de-perimeterised. Logically this seems to be the case - when some-
ones owns a laptop that features automatic updates, external parties can
influence it.
Figure 1 illustrates several situations. In the first situation, A is influ-
enced by B and has no authority over B. Thus A is de-perimeterised. In
the second situation, A solves this problem by placing B under its control.
The last situation shows a more complex and de-perimeterised situation,
where B is under control of both A and C.
2.3 Perimeter structure
We can further improve our understanding of de-perimeterisation if we
consider the structure of a perimeter and its environment.
According to Merriam-Webster [24], a perimeter is the bound plane
of a closed figure and security is the condition of being protected against
danger or loss. For IT this is usually defined in terms of CIA (Confi-
dentiality, Integrity, Availability). This means that if the confidentiality,
integrity an availability of a resource can be maintained, it is considered
to be protected against danger or loss.
Thus, a security perimeter is a boundary between an asset and the
outer world, where there is a difference between the security inside the
boundary and outside of it. The perimeter can bring that difference about,
but it can also be just the border. In IT, a security perimeter could
typically be a firewall around a system.
This allows us to view a perimeter and its context as consisting of
several elements. Usually a perimeter is not closed completely, there is
traffic between the inside and outside. The traffic goes through a gate.
Inside the perimeter there is monitoring, periodic security checks of the
assets and the traffic.2 Actors, meaning legal entities such as persons
or organisations, interact with, or control assets. Attacks can take place
that reduce the security of the inside. From a structural perspective, then,
security perimeter and its context consist of five elements shown in Figure
3.
From a structural perspective, de-perimeterisation is a process rather
than a state. It is a process in which
1. the number of gates increases, or they become bigger
2. assets are moved outside of the perimeter
An example of the first trend is organisations getting faster Internet
connections, the second occurs when a firewall becomes less effective or is
removed, or when an organisation outsources its assets. However, there is
no fixed point where an organisation becomes de-perimeterised.
2One of the problems of de-perimeterisation is that this monitoring becomes more difficult
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Figure 1: Perimeter and environment
2.4 Definitions
In the previous sections, we have investigated “de-perimeterisation” and
seen that it is driven by several trends, and that organisations are always
de-perimeterised to some extent.
Figure 4 summarises the two perspectives we have taken on de-perimeterisation.
Combining these, we define a security perimeter as follows:
A security perimeter is a technical solution to protect assets
from negative influences originating in its environment.
This combines several elements:
• A security perimeter serves to protect an asset
• The threat originates in the environment
Turning to de-perimeterisation, the structural perspective shows that
de-perimeterisation is a combination of increased and unfiltered traffic
through gates in the perimeter, as well as the movement of assets outside
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Asset The resource inside the perimeter
Environment The resources outside of the perimeter
Perimeter The boundary between the asset and the environment
Gate The opening in the perimeter through which traffic occurs
Actor The legal entity controlling or interacting with the asset
Figure 2: Security perimeter model
AssetAsset
Environment
Gate
Perimeter
Actors
Figure 3: Perimeter and environment
Perspective Definition
Phenomena Technical solution that reduces negative influences from one legal entity
to the other
Structure Border protecting an asset against the environment
Figure 4: Security perimeter definitions
of the perimeter. And looking at de-perimeterisation phenomena, organi-
sations and individuals are increasingly influencing each other, while there
are no clear authority relations between them. This leads us to define de-
perimeterisation as follows
Increased, flexible and often unknown connectivity between
systems owned or controlled by different legal entities
There are three important elements in this definition:
• Different legal entities are involved
• New connections are created between systems
• Connections are not clearly defined
3 De-perimeterisation mechanisms
How did de-perimeterisation evolve historically? Obviously, any answer
to this question requires a closer examination of the Internet; After all, it
is this structure that made it possible for organisations to connect on an
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unprecedented scale. We therefore look briefly at the history of the Inter-
net and how its development affected IT security. Figure 5 summarises
the de-perimeterisation mechanisms ands their impact on the security
perimeter.
3.1 Scaling up: From private to public space
When we think in terms of security, it is noteworthy to point out that
the Internet started as a very small place. In fact, it began with just one
node in 1969, when the first computer was installed that would become
part of the ARPANET, the predecessor of what we now call the Internet.
By the end of 1969, there were already 4 nodes [22]. At the onset, the
Internet itself was a more or less trusted system. With a limited number
of servers connected to it and a limited number of people that operated
those servers, there was little to fear. There was also little need for and
knowledge about protecting resources connected to the Internet. After
1969, the Internet continued to grow. In 1977, there were already 111
[34] nodes, in 1988 56,000. As a place, the Internet itself became less
secure; more people had access. At the same time the systems that were
connected to it increased in value, making them potentially attractive
targets. It also became clear how weaknesses in networks and systems
could be exploited. One of the earliest attacks was the so-called Internet
worm that replicated itself among hosts, starting on November 2nd, 1988
[33]. This can be viewed as the end of the Internet as a more or less
private and trusted space. The Internet grew to over 36 million hosts in
1998 and to over 500 million in 2008 [5]. Today, the Internet is part of the
public space and people worry about its insecurity, just like they would if
it were a street corner. It is no longer the sole domain of US universities
and government agencies; other countries, individuals and businesses take
part as well.
3.2 The firewall: Separating private from public
The first real separation between the public Internet and the private In-
tranets began around 1987, when so-called firewalls were first deployed [29].
According to Power and Fallow, a firewall is a machine or collection of
machines between two networks, meeting the following criteria
• The firewall is at the boundary between the two networks;
• All traffic between the two networks must pass through the firewall;
• The firewall has a mechanism to allow some traffic to pass while
blocking other traffic.
The rules describing what traffic is allowed enforce the firewall’s policy.
Note that this definition does not imply any different levels of security
between the two networks. In practice however, firewalls were used to
protect internal, trusted networks from the Internet. At first, the firewall
could just be a single device or program, that separated a trusted system
from the Internet. On the Internet, these firewalls were the first security
perimeters.
3.3 Technological de-perimeterisation mechanisms
Since 1987 the Internet and its users have changed enormously and so did
the security mechanisms that people deployed to defend their systems.
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This gradually led to the disappearance of the idea of a single security
perimeter. For convenience, we group these changes into two categories:
• Technological changes of the Internet and the systems that connected
to it
• Changes in the way that organisations do their business.
Of course, these changes are not independent; Technological changes make
new business processes possible; Developments in organisations place dif-
ferent demands on technologies which change in their turn.
Network capacity increased: Greater reliability needed Firstly,
the capacity and performance of the networks and the networked comput-
ers increased. A typical end-user modem in the 1980s had a speed of 1200
bit/s, but today some ADSL modems can achieve a downstream speed of
24Mbit/s, or 20.000 times faster 3. The consequence is that the firewall
must filter much more data. At the same time, it became much more crit-
ical to filter this data. A well-used reliability standard is that of the five
nines, a system has an optimal level of reliability if it is working 99.999%
of the time. For a device, this means that there is an average window of 5
minutes and 15 seconds per year in which it will not function. This might
not seem like a lot, but for a firewall, in the case of ADSL, close to 1GB
of data can be transferred in this time window.
Internal network size growth: Firewall distribution Another
development was the increase in size of the internal networks, so-called
Intranets. As a consequence, they became less trusted. Combined with
the fallibility of firewalls this led to an approach of defence-in-depth with
intrusion detection systems or IDSs. These systems would check Internet
traffic inside the organisational network. In the early days of the Internet,
these could consist simply of print-outs from audit trails that were checked
by an administrator [21]. Later, automated and more complicated sys-
tems emerged, which complemented the firewalls. Also, organisations
started to split-up their networks. Some hosts needed to be accessible
from the Internet itself (such as web and email servers) and were placed
in a special zone called DMZ or demilitarised zone [29]. The internal net-
work was then protected by another firewall. Nowadays, many devices
have firewalls themselves and do not rely on organisational firewalls to
protect themselves. Again, these developments distort the idea of a single
security perimeter.
Network mobility and connectivity increase: Connection
overload The way in which organisations connected to the Internet
also changed. In the early days of the Internet, it was not uncommon
for organisations to have just one connection. This changed into a situ-
ation where organisations have many different connections, for example
to facilitate load-balancing and increased reliability. This adds additional
complexity to the security perimeter. Also, the nature of the networks
has become more dynamic. This is especially the case when we look at
wireless networks. Devices such as laptops and mobile phones can con-
nect to the Internet, independently of the corporate network that they
supposedly belong to.
3According to the ADSL2+M standard
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Encryption usage: Content invisible In the mean-time com-
munication protocols changed. Earlier, there were a limited number of
applications and protocols that could be easily distinguished and filtered.
If email was not allowed, it could be blocked. If file access should be
possible, it was allowed. However, these protocols began to merge. Nowa-
days, protocols for web browsing, email and instant messaging can all send
or receive files. Secondly, many of these protocols are using encryption,
which ensures that traffic between two end-points cannot be decoded.
This makes it hard for the firewall to do a content analysis on the traffic,
and decide what it should let pass.
Unintended consequences: The connection paradox Finally,
we need to consider that Internet connectivity has become both a threat
and a cure. This paradox started when the number of applications that
required Internet access increased. Now that all these computers are con-
nected, they became an attractive target for hackers. They would search
for vulnerabilities in the software that could be exploited. This situation
leads to frequent patches from software vendors. The time between the
discovery of vulnerabilities and their exploits has decreased 4 - and this,
in combination with the increased amount of servers, led to automated
patching: Systems frequently contact their vendors and check if updates
are available. All this requires Internet access - to protect the servers
from the same Internet that threatens them. 5 Note the servers’ security
also depends directly on the vendors: One wrong patch can damage many
servers in very little time [8].
3.4 Organisational de-perimeterisation mechanisms
Low communication costs made it possible for organisations to utilise
resources from outside of the organisation.
Remote access: Telework A first consequence is that the organisa-
tion’s physical location and its business do not need to coincide anymore.
Employees can work from home, using the exact same data that is avail-
able at the office. Sales representatives can stay connected to the main
business network while being with a customer. It is debatable whether
this is a real breakthrough caused by the Internet. Even without Internet
access, employees can still do useful work on mobile devices when they
are not connected. All that is required is some working data, that can be
synchronised with the main branch once they are available at the office.
However, improved Internet connectivity did increase the scale at which
this happens. The connections blurred the security perimeter even more,
because employees can be physically outside of the office, while they have
access to everything inside it.
Outsourcing IT: mixed security zones Secondly, the Internet
made it possible to outsource and insource services on an unprecedented
scale; that is, once they were encoded in a digital form. A good example is
4In fact, releasing a patch can actually increase the chance of an exploit - reverse engineered
it will show what problem it was meant to solve - and thus reveal the vulnerability
5It is important to point out that an airgap does not provide ultimate security any more.
Any useful system nowadays has undiscovered vulnerabilities. If it is not patched, it will not
be protected against future exploits and will thus be very vulnerable when it is stolen. All
that is needed for an attacker is sufficient time for the vulnerabilities to be discovered.
12
the outsourcing of IT maintenance itself. If an organisation could find no
competitive advantage in having its own system administrators, it could
outsource the jobs to another company. Their employees could then re-
motely access the network and perform the necessary maintenance. This
organisation’s servers are in a mixed zone: They are not entirely inside
the perimeter, but neither are they outside the perimeter.
ASP model: Data stored externally In the previous exam-
ple, the organisation’s physical servers were still inside the organisation’s
building, but that began to change. Organisations started to put appli-
cations for rent on the Internet as if they were services. This business
model is called the application service provider model, or simply ASP.
The consequence was that one organisation’s data would be under another
organisation’s physical control. Again, the security perimeter blurred.
SOA and virtualisation: Mixed security zones How advanced
the ASP model might be, it was not the end of the outsourcing develop-
ment. As the number of customers for and ASP grew, it became difficult
to satisfy all their requirements. A new feature that would be useful to
one customer, would be a breaking change for another. The solutions was
to offer more fine-grained structures or services. Other parties could then
orchestrate these into new business processes on their services. This is the
service oriented architecture (SOA) [30]. Other variants are called SaaS
(Software as a Service) or PaaS (Platform as a Service). A final vari-
ant is virtualisation, where organisations can rent virtual servers on an
on demand basis, of which the underlying hardware is maintained by yet
other companies. Again, such systems represent a mixed security zone,
for which there is no single company responsible.
Business and employee dynamics: Flexible zones The Inter-
net also increased the pace in which business is possible. Organisations
are not static themselves; they are restructured, taken over, they merge.
People are no longer being full-time employed for one job; It is more com-
mon to work on inter-organisational projects for shorter periods of time,
for example on a joint-venture. Thus the security perimeter becomes very
flexible.
Individual empowerment: individual perimeters Another side
effect was that the availability of on-line high quality applications led to
empowerment of individuals. In many businesses, the Internet has low-
ered the barrier to entry until it was possible for individuals to work for
themselves. In such a case, there is no organisational security perimeter -
individuals secure their assets themselves.
Cooperation without contract: vanishing security zones In
the previous paragraphs we saw some examples where organisations out-
source or insource work; This is still done by contract. But in some cases,
connections (and dependencies) between organisations and/or individuals
function without any formal contract. This is the case for many search
engines, on which many people depend upon for their work. On-line ad-
vertisements make it possible for websites to deliver valuable services at
no cost to the customers. Some consider the Internet a public good [28],
and maybe search engines can also be seen in that way. Where is the
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security perimeter of a search engine, that scans the entire Internet and
delivers results for free?
We list the developments in Figure 5.
De-perimeterisation mechanism Impact on security perimeter
Network capacity increase Firewall reliability must increase
Internal network size growth Firewall distributed over internal network
Network mobility and connectivity increase More gates, mobile gates
Encryption Firewalls ineffective
Remote access Separation of physical and digital perimeter
Outsourcing IT Mixed security zones
Application service provider Data outside security perimeter
SOA and virtualisation Mixed security zones
Business and employee dynamics Flexible perimeters
Individual empowerment Organisational perimeter replaced by individ-
ual one
Cooperation without contract No perimeters
Figure 5: de-perimeterisation mechanisms and their impact on the security perimeter
4 The dynamics of the re-perimeterisation
cycle
4.1 Security impact
Obviously, as connections between systems increase in unknown ways, this
has implications for the security situation for businesses. However, are
these implications desirable or undesirable? Maybe de-perimeterisation
is not a problem. After all, IT works very well in general; In fact, the
occurrence of de-perimeterisation indicates that software and hardware
are very reliable and that most people that operate their systems are
trustworthy. Apparently it really does not matter whether your data
centre is located in Europe, the US, India or elsewhere. There are security
breaches, but a complete cascade failure of the Internet has not occurred
yet.
However, with respect to security, de-perimeterisation does threaten
organisations in several ways.
Dependencies are obscured In a networked world, it is not hard
to create very complex systems of systems, that work flawlessly for some
time. However, these systems have structural dependencies that only be-
come apparent when something goes wrong. For example, in 2007, Skype
went offline for some time after a massive reboot of Windows machines,
following an update. [31] Obviously, Skype was dependent on the patching
process of Windows, but this was unknown before the event. How likely
are such events in the future?
Risk assessment is hard An especially challenging problem is risk
assessment. For example the Common Criteria [7] uses protection pro-
files for specifying security requirements, as well as the concept of target
of evaluation, for the system for which the risk assessment is done. In
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many situations, these systems cannot be defined - we do not know what
the requirements are and we have no idea what kind of systems we are
dependent upon. That alone should be cause for concern.
Although IT systems are overall very reliable, we think that de-perimeterisation
does pose some challenges to everyone that deals with IT security. The
uncertainty of security increases and this makes risk assessment an espe-
cially challenging problem. It seems to be very difficult to do any kind of
risk assessment when the boundaries between systems are blurred.
Ineffective security mechanisms First of all, de-perimeterisation
reduces the effectiveness of security perimeters. We now examine the im-
plicit assumptions behind the consideration to deploy a security perimeter
P to protect asset A from asset B:
1. A is a valuable asset to some actor E
2. A can be located by E
3. A cannot protect itself
4. A is inside an threatening environment
5. It is desirable that A should be protected
6. It is possible to deploy P
7. P helps to protect A
8. P does not have too many negative side-effects for E (for example,
in a business environment, it is still possible to do business).
Clearly, with de-perimeterisation, these assumptions are becoming more
problematic.
1. In many cases we cannot locate the asset A, because it is not under
our control or it changes frequently.
2. Many assets are deemed to be capable to defend themselves against
threats, or the threat is unknown.
3. To assess the need for a security perimeter, we need to know the
risk; However, we have little information on the asset and cannot
assess the risk; In fact, we are not even responsible for its security.
4. We cannot always deploy a security perimeter around A because it
is not under our control.
5. Many security perimeter technologies do not really help to protect
A.
6. The security perimeter harms other business processes because it
cannot be configured precisely enough.
7. Even after deploying, we do not assume that A is secure, for example
because it is maintained by another organisation.
Continuing need for organisational security perimeter From
a legal point of view, we argue that the organisational security perimeter
should stay intact. After all, there remains a legal foundation for any
organisation. Each organisation
• has ownership of certain assets
• employs personnel
• is liable for its actions
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• can make profit
• has to pay taxes
Any useful security scheme should therefore deal with ownership, employer-
employee relations and liability. The duties and benefits of an employee
are tied to the organisation. A salesperson is responsible for selling a
particular product or service and is paid by the organisation. This is re-
gardless of where and how he works. Even outsourcing or off-shoring do
not change these basic facts. In spite of de-perimeterisation, the concept
of organisation does not change overnight. In fact, compared to the fast
developments in IT, the concept of organisation has remained rather sta-
ble. Consider an innovative organisation such as Google: It may have
its servers in many places in the world, serve as an application service
provider to millions of people, but it is still defined as an Inc, located in
Mountain View, having a notation on the NASDAQ.
If we “forget” that the organisational perimeter exists, and do not
implement a security perimeter around it, this will cause a loss of control,
which can have many consequences, such as a wrong allocation of benefits.
Most obviously, the CEO of an enterprise cannot give an “in control”
statement if he does not know which systems are part of the organisation
and which are not. Note that the consequences might not be immediately
apparent, as long as all systems work satisfactory. Only when problems
arise, when systems go out or malfunction, it will become apparent that
it is necessary to know which system was owned by whom and to whom
its benefits should be allocated.
If the organisation is to function at all, the supporting IT infrastructure
has to reflect its legal basis.
4.2 The re-perimeterisation cycle
Figure 6 shows the Jericho Forum’s view of the historical development
of de-perimeterisation [18, p.1]. According to this model, the trend is
toward more connectivity. However, our historical review shows that the
real trend is closer to an oscillation than to a straight line.
1. Before the Internet all systems we separated;
2. Next they were connected;
3. Then firewalls separated them once more;
4. The internal networks (Intranets) grew;
5. The internal networks were separated;
6. Currently the networks are connected again
This situation is depicted in Figure 7.
The oscillation is due to the interplay of two sets of opposing forces,
one in the direction of connectivity (de-perimeterisation), and one in the
direction of (re)perimeterisation.
The forces in the direction of connectivity include the desire for cost
reduction, flexibility and speed of business, facilitated by technological
developments. Enterprises see the advantages of e-business and open up
their networks. Consumers want to try out the latest available technology.
Universities want to develop and utilise the new infrastructures for their
own research. For many new technologies, their impact on security is not
clear. Parties that are not aware of this, or do not consider it a problem,
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Figure 6: Trends according to the Jericho Forum
will take the risk and adopt the technologies. Thus, there is no incentive
to invest early on in security features.
Once te hnologies become mainstre m, diff rent forces come into play,
leading to re-perimeterisation. Vulnerabilities will be found, and potential
users will demand security features to be fitted to the new technology,
before integrating it in their systems. Additional forces include the need
for accountability, proper allocation of benefits in a business network,
privacy, safety and reliability and company confidentiality.
Our prediction is that this oscilatory trend, rather than the linear
Jericho trend, will continue. The reason is twofold: First, we think that
for non-profit organisations and consumers, security is never a primary
selling point for new and untested technologies. Secondly, we think that
none of the forces in play will go away.
5 Re-perimeterisation mechanisms
The main question for re-perimeterisation is how to build effective perime-
ters, without undoing the positive effects of de-perimeterisation.
• what sort of perimeters should we build?
• around what assets should we place them?
• should the assets themselves be changed?
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Earlier we defined de-perimeterisation to be about connections be-
tween systems owned or controlled different legal entities. From this we
take it that we can solve it in two ways:
• Technical re-perimeterisation. Here we look for solutions to restruc-
ture systems and the way they influence each other.
• Organisational re-perimeterisation. Here we examine ways in which
to restructure organisations and the way they influence each other.
These will be discussed in the next sections.
5.1 Technical re-perimeterisation
In this section, we look at technical measures for re-perimeterisation, try-
ing to find out where we can put an effective security perimeter in place.
We will discuss putting perimeters around networks, data, endpoints,
the entire Internet as well as layered solutions.
5.1.1 Network perimeters
Network or firewall security allows us to limit data flow between different
systems, by inspecting and filtering the traffic that goes between them.
There are two typical scenarios: In the first, we need to protect an
asset against outside influences, in the second case, we want to prevent
information from leaking into the environment. Apart from packet level
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firewalls there are also application-layer firewalls, with can filter traffic at
the application-level. For example, we can filter email traffic and spam
can be returned directly at the border of the organisation. Vice versa,
emails can be scanned to prevent sensitive information to be communi-
cated to outsiders. Other examples are XML-firewalls used to filter and
route messages between different services in a service-oriented architecture
(SOA) environment.
The Jericho Forum [14] has argued for their abolition, claiming that
they hinder business rather than support it. Earlier, we saw how firewalls
became less and less effective, due to increased and encrypted traffic. A
requirement for such forms of security is that the network infrastructure
must be under control of the organisation - in a de-perimeterised world,
encryption must be regulated, such that the traffic can be inspected at
the perimeter.
5.1.2 Data perimeters
One of the relatively new ideas to battle de-perimeterisation is to place a
perimeter around the data, rather than around the entire infrastructure of
the organisation. The Jericho Forum has argued for this protection scheme
in their commandments [16]. The technical mechanisms are proposed in
two key articles by Agrawal et al. [1] and Grandison et al. [12].
There are several arguments for implementing security on the data
itself. A first argument is given by Grandison et al. [12], who state that
security must be data-centric because only the data has real business
value: The network of an organisation is of no serious concern if there is
no sensitive data on it. A firewall is unnecessary if there is no risk of a
security breach.
Secondly, it does not make sense to have a security perimeter include
more than is strictly necessary. In general, perimeters do not scale. In
addition, they tend to be less meaningful as the inside of a security perime-
ter increases in the number of assets to be protected. When the inside
increases, the difference in security levels between the inside and the out-
side diminishes: On a network of 10 servers all of them could possibly
be trusted, but this is not the case if the network is expanded to include
a thousand servers. Intrusion detection systems do not really solve this
problem.
A third argument is about business opportunities. The Jericho Fo-
rum [14] argued that organisation-level security perimeters actually hin-
der business rather than facilitate it. Security is in many cases not the
goal. Often, profit is more important and security must be cost effective.
Security is about risk management and opportunity costs: If you try to
close down the network (ineffective as it may be), how many business
opportunities are lost? To enable cooperation with other organisations it
makes sense to facilitate access to IT assets at the lowest possible levels,
and use these assets as building blocks for new business constellations.
Fourthly, if we compare the organisation to its data, we can find that
an organisation can change shape quite often, but the data will remain
relatively stable. For example, a hospital might be reorganised and re-
structured many times, whereas the patients and their data will remain
fixed. Putting security policies as the data level can be a form of future-
proofing security. Wherever the data will be in the future - it will be
known how they should be secured.
Conceptually, we see several branches of data-level security, one im-
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plemented at the level of a database, one implemented at the level of
particular data items and one where data is simply encrypted.
There are three main forms of data level security: database centered,
sticky policies and encryption.
Data level security - database centered The illustrative exam-
ple here is the Hippocratic database [1].6 It takes its name from the
Hippocratic oath that doctors must take to protect their patients and
keep their information confidential: Ideally a database should adhere to
the same principles automatically. A Hippocratic database has an exten-
sive set of tools to implement the required security policies. For example,
it would support K-anonymity and certain obligations. On top of this
database other applications can be built, that automatically comply with
all security policies.
Data level security - sticky policies In contrast to the Hippo-
cratic databases, where the data is stored centrally, there is the idea to
allow free movement of the data but enforce its security at every location.
Here, a data item is always associated with the policies that should be fol-
lowed. These sticky policies [2] cannot be separated from the data items
itself. DRM technology can be considered an example of this scheme.
For sticky policies to be effective, it is usually required to have a trusted
environment in which the data can flow: Policy enforcement is sometimes
done with the help of special hardware.
Data level security - encryption Another approach is to encrypt
data inside the database. For example credit card numbers are encrypted.
(This is actually one of the requirements of the PCI standard [6, p.5].)
Users that need access to the data need a key to decrypt it. Some systems
also make it possible to search through the data. The server might store a
text in encrypted form, and users can search for particular phrases. The
server is assumed to be “honest but curious”. Extra precautions must be
taken to prevent the server from learning too much about the plaintext.
Limitations Often, the smallest encapsulation of organisation-owned
data will necessarily encapsulate items at the organisational level, taking
us back to the organisational security perimeter.
As a practical example, consider the security system for a banking
application. Among other things, the security concept includes data in-
tegrity. Now it seems that data integrity here cannot be determined at
the level of individual bank accounts. If a sum of money is transferred
between two accounts, integrity is at least determined at the level of those
two accounts: The total amount of money before and after the transac-
tions should be the same. In fact the expected level will be substantially
higher:
• The calculations done in transferring data between accounts are done
by an application. For example, banks tend to retain money between
transfers for some time, which results in lower interest for their cus-
tomers. The retention time and interest rates are not determined by
the individual accounts. This indicates that security must be dealt
with at the application level.
6Both the data-centric security approach and the Hippocratic database were developed by
IBM
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• It is the bank that is accredited for performing financial transactions.
For this accreditation the bank will have to prove its operations are
valid. This is again a drive toward having security determined at
the organisation level.
Three basic facts that data-level security cannot deal with are:
Organisations do not cease to exist. For legal reasons alone, we
need to know what is inside and what is outside of the organisation. This
is an “undocumented” but essential function of the security perimeter.
The security of data itself cannot be assessed. Computa-
tional processes (and the applications, and the business processes) are
what makes the data secure in the first place. We cannot assess the se-
curity of data at face value, we need to know with which applications it
was generated and by whom.
Data needs to be exchanged with other systems Communi-
cation of data to other organisations and individuals is a necessity: The
problem of maintaining a secure data exchange cannot be addressed at
the data level.
If we are to see a move toward a more open architecture, we can expect
more from SOA (Service Oriented Architecture). Here an application is
structured as a set of services that can be accessed by many parties,
potentially outside of the organisation. Each of these services can be
configured for optimal security. If the bank properly aligns its business
and IT systems there will be only one such security service that will closely
match the organisational perimeter.
Generally, most data-centric solutions are aimed at data confidentiality
- but are less well suited for improving integrity and availability.
5.1.3 Endpoint perimeters
The principle of endpoint security dictates two things:
• When there is communication between two nodes (or endpoint), each
node is responsible for maintaining its own security
• Communication between the nodes is secured
If required, policies for endpoints can be centrally managed. Forms of
endpoint security are personal firewalls, anti-virus software on client PCs,
VPN and SSL/TLS connections.
In the case when the network infrastructure is fragmented and commu-
nications between nodes are ad-hoc, endpoint security limits the security
implications: The network (apart from reliability) does not have to be
secured anymore.
Ideally, each endpoint is a very simple system which is easy to secure.
Unfortunately, for an end-user, an endpoint normally means a PC, which
is so complicated that it is not reasonable to assume its security in many
cases. It is also a single point of failure - once one the endpoint is hacked
the security of the entire network is completely breached.
5.1.4 Multi-layer perimeters
In multi-layer security, there are different zones that each have different
security levels. Typically, the inner-most part is the best secured part. In
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situations where services are outsourced, this model can be extended [35]
to include an extended security perimeter. We also see similar situations
where firewalls are used; The inner parts are then protected by several
shells of firewalls.
The reason for using multi-layer security is that there are distinct
parts of a system or organisation that need to be better secured than
other; while the parts that surround it are also under the control of the
organisation. As such, it allows for defense-in-depth. (If a public accessi-
ble webserver has to be secured, the concept of multi-layer security might
not be of much use). Multi-level security is a defense-in-depth approach
to security. As such it can help to counter de-perimeterisation.
In the multilayer security model defined by Walker [35], the security
is split into four parts:
• Electronic Security Environment (ESE)
• Local Security Environment (LSE)
• Global Security Environment (GSE)
• Extended Security Environment (XSE)
In the ESE, the assets are databases and applications, the mechanisms
is endpoint security. The LSE has a firewall and defines policies and rules
for auditing. The GSE is the outer organisational perimeter. The XSE is
the trusted environment outside of the organisational area of control.
The drawback of multi-layered solutions is that they can become very
complicated, especially when a layer has to be partitioned itself, for ex-
ample because each business partner requires its own environment.
5.1.5 Internet perimeter security
A more radical approach is to put a perimeter around the entire Inter-
net. Such an approach is for example foreseen by Lessig [23]. “Ideally”,
Internet access is restricted to those systems and individuals that have
identified themselves properly. There have been a number of initiatives
that would support such an architecture. So far, only building blocks
have been developed, including IPV6, identity management systems and
trusted computing chips.
With a functioning identity layer, trust becomes easier to organise, as
organisations do not have to built the trust network themselves.
Realising such a perimeter around the whole Internet is unfeasible.
First the entire infrastructure needs to be changed; Secondly there is a
privacy problem: identifying everyone and every device means that pri-
vacy is lost. Thirdly we need to take into account existing laws in all
countries connected to the Internet. So far, attempts to create even lim-
ited forms of identity layers (such as Microsoft Passport [26]) have failed.
5.2 Organisational re-perimeterisation
We will now move to the organisational measures for re-perimeterisation,
trying to find out how we can rearrange the responsibilities of different
legal parties involved.
5.2.1 Organisation perimeters
Here we try to partly undo some of the causes of de-perimeterisation. For
example, when the management of applications was outsourced, it can be
insourced again, and placed under control of the organisation.
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Technical re-perimeterisation mechanism Conditions Disadvantages
Network perimeter Network and protocols
must be controllable
Cost, complexity
Data - database centred perimeter Processing is less im-
portant than storage
Mostly useful for con-
fidentiality
Data - sticky policies perimeter Environment is
trusted
Mostly useful for con-
fidentiality
Data - encryption perimeter Processing is less im-
portant than storage
Mostly useful for con-
fidentiality
Endpoint perimeter Endpoints can be se-
cured
Single point of failure
Multi-layer perimeter Ability to manage
complexity
Complexity
Internet perimeter Privacy and legal
problems are solved
Not feasible
Figure 8: Technical mechanisms and requirements
The main advantage of this approach is that it reduces the amount of
legal parties involved. This perimeter type is typically used in financial
institutions and governments.There, certain risks are simply unacceptable
and must always be treated, and cost is less of an issue. Organisational
perimeterisation can be done on the condition that the organisation has
control over its network and has the available expertise to maintain it.
The biggest problems with this solution are cost and lost business
opportunities: It can be very difficult to manage applications properly, it
required highly trained and expensive personnel. This also holds true over
time: Once a system is hard to maintain, it is also difficult to upgrade
or replace and the organisation cannot benefit from newer solutions. Sec-
ondly, and organisational perimeter hinders external communication with
partners and thus results in lost business opportunities.
5.2.2 Individual perimeters
It could also be possible to maintain security under a dissolving organisa-
tional security perimeter using another method: By making every individ-
ual responsible for keeping himself and his own devices secure. Already
in [13] it was observed that security was moving into this direction. The
idea is explored here in to more detail. A system is said to be using indi-
vidual centric security if the burden of maintaining security is put down
on individual users. They are responsible for keeping the system up and
running and have to make decisions with security implications. These
implications are usually (and ideally) limited to the user himself. There
is not necessarily a central or higher authority involved.
The main rationale is that in many cases, there is not one organisation
that can provide oversight or control. The world is simply too complex
and it would be too expensive to management systems centrally. Instead,
people place trust in each other.
• Individuals work in multiple organisations, on joint projects
• Individuals have their own personal IT infrastructure
• Individuals manage their own work
• Individuals own data themselves
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• Individuals can manage their own IT infrastructure
It can be argued that the only reason for centralised administrative control
is when ownership does not coincide with individuals. If a person works on
his own laptop on his own project, on his own document, in his own free
time, there is a perfect match and no organisational security perimeter is
needed.
An example of the shift towards individual centric security is the trend
to replace shared PCs by individual laptops and mobile phones: Rather
than having a uniform set of desktops in place, where everyone can login
at any PC, organisations are now shifting towards a concept where users
all have their own laptop. Rather than using shared land-line phones in
the office, users now carry their own mobile phones with them. Each
user maintains his own system and has to make sure he installs patches
regularly, make daily backups etc. Another example is a peer-to-peer file
sharing system, where users exchange data with each other, based on a
certain protocol. Each user can search and download files - but cannot
make decisions affecting other users or influence resources that he does
not directly own. Skype [3] can also said to be using individual centric
security. Individual users communicate through it, sign up for accounts,
invite others to participate in their communications. In general, Skype
will not care much about user security of accounts, data loss etc., as long
as the Skype service can still be used. Skype communication is supposed
to be secure - but everything else is up to the users. Some systems that
store medical information also use individual-centric solutions for example
Microsoft Healthvault [25] or Google Health [11]. Here individuals can
manage their own medical information and decide themselves who will
get access to these records (for example which doctor or which family
member).
There are some situations when ownership and control will never co-
incide with individuals, and individual centric security is not possible:
• Working as a factory worker on a conveyor belt
• Doing a bank transaction for a company as an employee
• Using a collaborative resource such as Blackboard or EPrints.
• Working at a company during office hours: The company can de-
mand that some applications will not be used.
Organisations are a natural way to structure economic activity (Cf. Coase
[4]). It is impossible to think of building a passenger aeroplane alone and
every employee in a firm will have some form of administrative control
imposed on him. In such cases, individual centric security is at odds with
organisational alignment.
A specific disadvantage is that individual centric security has a ten-
dency to mutate into other forms of security.
• In the healthcare domain for example, if a medical file would be
controlled by one patient, he still has to give some authorisations to
a hospital, because he cannot authorise all nurses individually.
• As for Skype, its underlying infrastructure will have to be managed
somehow, and this will probably not rely on individual centric secu-
rity.
• In social network sites, basically connections of individuals, organ-
isational accounts appear, which do not fit well into the individual
centric concept. For example, Warner Bross, a multi-billion dollar
24
company, has it’s own user account on YouTube called “warner-
brosrecords”. This leads to the conceptual problem of which em-
ployee (or employees) of Warner Bross has access to this accounts,
and whether user rights are managed by either Warner Bross or by
YouTube, since no single Warner Bross employee owns the rights to
a video clip.
Another problem is that individual users might not be capable of securely
configuring their systems. In the case of medical files, users might need to
set authorisations to all kinds of doctors, check the audit trails for unau-
thorised access. A user has to maintain its own laptop, install patches,
configure the firewall etc. etc.
5.2.3 Virtual organisation perimeters
Whereas with federated systems organisations agree to exchange data,
with virtual organisations [27], we can create a new organisational struc-
ture between the organisations themselves. Employees of different organ-
isations can become a member of this virtual organisation.
Effectively, this reduces the amount of connections between different
legal entities. An example of virtual organisation usage is in grid com-
puting. Here, different institutions cooperate in using resources from yet
other organisations or even individuals. By combining the institutions
into one virtual organisation, the resource owners only need to deal with
one organisation. Another typical case is when companies have an out-
sourcing relation and create a separate unit to monitor a service-level
agreement. In order to use virtual organisations, initial trust in other
parties is required.
A negative aspect is that a virtual organisation is another organisation,
and can thus also introduce new complexity and connections, because
employees might now be a member of two organisations rather than just
one.
5.2.4 Federated perimeters
Another solution direction is to use federated systems [10]. If security
cannot be addressed on the organisational level, it could be implemented
at the inter-organisational level, by putting a security perimeter around
multiple organisations. In a federated solution, several organisations agree
to use a shared security solution, the features of which can be used by all
participating organisations.
A federated solution can help in difficult security situations such as
’person P works on a website that is owned by organisation X, on data
owned by organisation Y from a computer owned by organisation Z’. Fed-
erated systems can especially help with identification and authorisation.
If someone is identified at one organisation, he can use his credentials at
another organisation. A specific case is when the federated solution is
provided or even mandated by the government. Federated systems scale
very well. In a network with N systems, we only need one extra connec-
tion from the root system to a new system. Where the network built on
an ad hoc basis, we might need to build N different connections. The ad-
vantage of federated security is that the amount of connections between
organisations can be reduced drastically. Examples of federated solutions
are Microsoft’s Windows Live ID and its Active Directory where manage-
ment domains can be placed in a hierarchical relation (so called forests).
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An example of a government identification scheme is the Dutch DigiD
system [37].
The main problem is that we need to rely on a centrally managed
site. If multiple organisations want to work together they must come
to some form of agreement. There could also be legal problems, when
organisations cannot share their data.
Overview of all mechanisms We will now list all mechanisms and
the requirements they impose on correct implementation.
Organisational re-perimeterisation mechanism Conditions Disadvantages
Organisation perimeter Expertise, control Cost, lost business op-
portunities
Individual perimeter Control and ownership
rest by the individual,
expertise
Insecurity
Virtual organisation perimeter Cooperation is possi-
ble
New complexity
Federation perimeter Cooperation is possi-
ble, trust
Loss of control
Figure 9: Organisational mechanisms and requirements
6 Discussion and further work
We have defined the concept of de-perimeterisation and shown that it is
not a steady process, but a cyclic one. In one cycle, different forces accel-
erate de-perimeterisation, after which other forces slow it down, leading
to re-perimeterisation.
We derived that there are basically two methods for “re-perimeterisation”:
1. We can put technical security perimeters around different parts of
IT: for example around data, around endpoints or try to use a multi-
layered approach.
2. We can re-engineer the legal constructions in which the systems func-
tion: for example by focusing on individual responsibility or creating
virtual organisations.
Together the options provide a framework that IT and business archi-
tects can use together for developing secure, re-perimeterised solutions,
which can survive in today’s networked world.
In the future, we would like to investigate how technical re-perimeterisation
options can be combined with the organisational options. So far, we have
only sketched the requirements and limitations of each individually.
Physical security was not discussed in this paper. We plan to inves-
tigate this further. Also, we can apply additional perspectives on de-
perimeterisation. The first concerns identity - one of the recurring prob-
lems in de-perimeterisation is identification - often it is a precondition for
trust. When organisations are cooperating, they need to know with whom
and with which IT systems they are dealing. This view is also related to
the emerging discipline of context-aware security: security depends on the
context and the context is described in terms of identities, such as build-
ings, persons, information systems. Much of this information is missing
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now, and de-perimeterisation can thus be seen as a step in the process of
embedding physical and organisational context inside of IT.
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